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In this paper, I argue that presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness 
ontology. That is, presentists should endorse the view that there are thisnesses of  past and present entities; for 
a given x, x’s thisness is the property being-x or being-identical-with-x. A thisness ontology has been suggested 
before, e.g. Adams (1986) and Diekemper (2015), but no one has yet acknowledged the considerable work 
that such an ontology can do in defence of  presentism.  Here, I propose a version of  presentism that 1
incorporates a thisness ontology, ‘Thisness Presentism’. I argue that this view solves important problems facing 
standard versions of  presentism. 
The plan for the paper is as follows. In §1, I articulate my proposed thisness ontology, noting the influence of  
Adams and Diekemper, in the context of  developing Thisness Presentism. In §2, I introduce two important 
problems facing presentism, concerning (i) the existence of  structured singular propositions about merely past 
objects and (ii) the truth of  propositions about the past. Neither problem for presentism seems to have been 
convincingly dealt with in the extant literature to date. In §3, I use the proposed ontology to solve both 
problems and argue that this constitutes good indirect support for Thisness Presentism. Finally, in §4, I 
distinguish my view from others in the literature (e.g. Keller, 2004). 
1.	 Thisnesses and Presentism 
A ‘thisness’ is a particular, primitive, purely non-qualitative property of  an object; the property of  being a 
certain object. For a given x, x’s thisness is the property being-x or being-identical-with-x. For example, Barack 
Obama’s thisness is the property being-identical-with-Obama. This basic idea can be sketched in various ways, 
but my concern is to develop a notion of  thisness that will vindicate presentism. I propose the following 
picture: 
(a)	 The Nature of  a Thisness—every object instantiates a thisness; a thisness is a particular, primitive, purely 
non-qualitative property of  an object. 
 	 Keller (2004: 96-99) proposes that presentists accept a thisness ontology in order to solve the ‘truth-maker problem’ 1
for presentism. Keller’s view, called ‘Haecceitist Presentism’, is an important precursor to the view articulated in this 
paper, but Haecceitist Presentism is both underdeveloped and under-defended. My contribution in this paper is to 
develop and defend a parallel view (‘Thisness Presentism’) in much more detail and to show what work a thisness 
ontology can do for presentists. I discuss the truth-maker problem for presentism in §§2-3 and I distinguish my view 
from Keller’s view in §4. For more on Thisness Presentism, see Ingram (2016).
(b)	 The Life of  a Thisness—a thisness T comes into being with an object x, T is uniquely instantiated by x 
throughout x’s existence, and T continues to exist uninstantiated when x has ceased to exist. 
(c)	 The Character of  a Thisness—a thisness T instantiates higher-order properties, which characterise the 
object that instantiates T, x; the relevant properties of  T initially correspond to the lower-order 
properties of  x. 
With respect to (a) and (b), I follow Adams (1986) and Diekemper (2015), but the addition of  (c) enables me to 
develop my view, Thisness Presentism. In §§1.1-1.3, I look more closely at this view, before turning to the 
problems facing presentism in §2. 
1.1.	 The Nature of  a Thisness 
Every object has a thisness and thisnesses are properties of  a novel sort, i.e. they are particular, primitive, 
purely non-qualitative properties (Adams, 1979). Two things should be noted about this characterisation. 
First, thisnesses are non-qualitative properties. A precise account of  the distinction between qualitative and 
non-qualitative properties is elusive, but non-qualitative properties seem to involve objects, in a sense, and 
qualitative properties do not. For instance, the property being-a-homeowner is qualitative whereas being-the-owner-
of-1600-Pennsylvania-Avenue is non-qualitative. Thisnesses are non-qualitative since they involve objects in this 
way; Obama’s thisness, for instance, is non-qualitative since it involves Obama. Nevertheless, thisnesses can 
exist in the absence of  the objects they involve. (I return to this point below in §1.2.) Second, thisnesses are 
primitive properties. As such, thisnesses cannot be reduced to (or analysed in terms of) any purely qualitative 
properties or relations to other objects. Qua primitive properties, thisnesses are to be understood as simple, 
unstructured entities. 
Thisnesses are properties, but they comprise a sui generis category of  properties. Thisnesses are like other 
properties in certain key respects, but do not fit into one particular category. Diekemper (2015) makes this 
point neatly, as follows: 
‘[Thisnesses] resist categorization under other common property kinds: they are like universals in that they seem 
to be abstract, and they are like essences in that they are essential to their bearers, but since they are also 
necessarily unique to their bearers, they are not universal! In their uniqueness, they are like tropes (conceived of  
as individual accidents), except that they are not accidental. So thisnesses are neither universals, nor mere 
essences, nor individual accidents, rather they are individual essences; and, as such, it is not clear which category 
they fall under or how one ought to conceive of  their ontology.’ (Diekemper, 2015: 50) 
Since thisnesses cannot be understood as belonging to any ‘common property kinds’, as Diekemper puts it, I 
treat them as members of  a distinct, sui generis category. The positive account of  thisnesses as properties (of  
a novel kind) is as follows: thisnesses are abstract, essential, unique, and non-accidental. 
1.2.	 The Life of  a Thisness 
For a given object x, x’s thisness T comes into being with x, T is uniquely instantiated by x throughout x’s 
existence, and T continues to exist uninstantiated when x has ceased to exist (Adams, 1986). Thus there are 
thisnesses of  past and present objects, but no thisnesses of  (merely) future objects. For example, Caesar’s 
thisness (being-identical-with-Caesar) did not exist before Caesar existed. Caesar’s thisness came into being with 
Caesar, was uniquely instantiated by Caesar throughout his life, and exists uninstantiated after Caesar ceased 
to exist. This view of  thisness permanence is adapted from Adams (1986). In what follows, I briefly propose a 
way to understand this view, acceptable to presentists. 
A thisness (e.g. being-identical-with-x) can exist without the relevant object (x). But, x’s thisness cannot exist before 
x exists; it can only continue to exist after x has existed. Thisnesses are contingent existents. In an important 
sense, x’s thisness depends upon x for its existence: x’s thisness, for instance, could not exist if  x never exists. 
To illustrate, consider Caesar’s thisness. The existence of  Caesar’s thisness implies a relation with Caesar that 
could not obtain were it the case that Caesar had never existed. Importantly, this is not to claim that Caesar’s 
thisness cannot exist if  Caesar does not exist now. One way to capture the relation between thisness and 
object is as follows: x’s thisness ontologically depends on x insofar as x’s thisness could not exist without the 
initial existence of  x. However, this ontological dependence does not imply that x’s thisness must cease to exist 
once x ceases to exist. The initial existence of  x is sufficient for the existence of  x’s thisness; the loss of  x does 
not necessitate the loss of  x’s thisness. But, since ontological dependence (standardly construed) is a relation, 
and a relation cannot hold unless its relata exist, the relationship of  ontological dependence between an 
object and its thisness should not be construed in the standard way. The solution to this problem is that x’s 
thisness ontologically depends on x in a ‘non-rigid’ way, following Diekemper (2015). 
Diekemper (2015) introduces the idea that x’s thisness ‘non-rigidly’ ontologically depends on x, attributing the 
notion to Lowe (2006). The ‘non-rigidity’ of  the dependence is temporal (rather than modal). The basic idea 
is: the existence of  x’s thisness, T, ontologically depends on x’s initial existence, but T doesn’t continue to 
depend on x; T merely has depended on x (2015: 65-66). Put differently, T depends on the initial existence, 
not the continuing existence, of  x. This is how to understand the relationship of  temporal non-rigid 
ontological dependence involved in the thisness ontology presented here.  2
One might question whether T always non-rigidly depends upon x. The answer is no. The relationship of  
dependence does not always hold. It cannot hold, for instance, when x does not exist. But this is no problem 
given non-rigid ontological dependence. There is some time at which T ontologically depends on x, i.e. the 
initial existence of  x. 
Here is a putative definition of  asymmetric, temporal, non-rigid ontological dependence:  
(NRD)	 x non-rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) Necessarily, x exists only if  y has existed; and, (ii) it is 
not the case that, necessarily, y exists only if  x has existed.  3
This notion of  dependence, (NRD), captures the idea that if  x depends on y for its existence, x cannot exist 
without the initial existence of  y. (NRD) also allows that x does not depend for its existence on the existence 
of  its thisness. This illustrates the sense in which x’s thisness depends on x, but this is not the whole story. (As 
stated, x’s thisness does not continue to depend on x for its existence; the relation obtains for an instant; x and 
x’s thisness come into being at the same moment.) To be clear, (NRD) is a variety of  ontological dependence, 
not merely causal dependence; the way in which x’s thisness depends on x is ontological, not causal. 
1.3.	 The Character of  a Thisness 
The third aspect of  the thisness ontology proposed is that x’s thisness, T, instantiates higher-order properties 
that indirectly characterise x, and such properties initially correspond to the lower-order properties of  x. Put 
another way, an important class of  the higher-order properties instantiated by a thisness indirectly 
characterise the object that initially instantiates the thisness (in virtue of  characterising the thisness itself). 
Consider, for example, Obama’s thisness. Obama’s thisness instantiates second-order properties that 
characterise itself  and that indirectly characterise Obama, e.g. Obama’s thisness presently instantiates being-
the-thisness-of-a-President. 
 	 The thisness ontology proposed is inspired by Adams (1979; 1981; 1986). And, an important precursor to my view is 2
suggested by Keller (2004). Neither Adams nor Keller fully develops an account of  the relationship between object 
and thisness, nor do they explain how a thisness ontologically depends on an object. The proposal that the 
relationship between object and thisness is one of  asymmetric, temporal, non-rigid ontological dependence is an 
important aspect of  making a thisness ontology acceptable to presentists, building upon Adams’s and Keller’s 
accounts.
 	 Compare a standard ‘rigid’ notion of  ontological dependence, e.g. (RD) x rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) 3
Necessarily, x exists only if  y exists; and, (ii) it is not the case that, necessarily, y exists only if  x exists (cf. Lowe, 2010: 
§1). It is worth noting that there is some dissatisfaction with such modal formulations of  ontological dependence 
theses in the extant literature. (See, e.g., Koslicki (2012; 2013) for discussion of  alternatives.) Even so, I take it that my 
account can serve as a helpful heuristic, even for those unconvinced by modal formulations of  dependence theses.—
I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
One way to explain this feature of  thisnesses is to note that the relevant second-order properties of  Obama’s 
thisness correspond to Obama’s first-order properties. A thisness, T, gains higher-order properties that 
indirectly characterise its object, x, as a natural part of  the relationship between object and thisness; T 
instantiates higher-order properties that correspond to x’s lower-order properties. The relevant properties of  
T also depend (in a sense) on x’s properties, e.g. Obama’s thisness instantiates being-the-thisness-of-a-President 
because Obama instantiates being-President. Obama’s thisness would not instantiate the second-order property 
if  Obama never instantiated the corresponding first-order property. Put simply, if  Obama was not President, 
Obama’s thisness would not be the thisness of  a President; so, if  Obama never instantiates being-President, 
Obama’s thisness would not instantiate being-the-thisness-of-a-President. 
Similarly, x’s thisness T loses properties as a natural part of  the relationship between x and T. A thisness, T, 
cannot lose a higher-order property that indirectly characterises x unless x loses the corresponding lower-
order property. Obama’s thisness cannot lose being-the-thisness-of-a-President unless Obama loses the 
corresponding being-President. This is necessary (but not sufficient) for a thisness to lose this kind of  property: T 
instantiates higher-order properties because x has instantiated corresponding lower-order properties. The loss 
of  a property by x is not sufficient for T to lose a corresponding property; in order for T to change with 
respect to a given property, there must be a sense in which the property no longer correctly characterises T. 
The circumstances according to which a property fails to correctly characterise its bearer are plain. Obama’s 
thisness cannot lose being-the-thisness-of-a-President unless this property fails to correctly characterise the thisness 
(its bearer). This property fails to correctly characterise the thisness only if  Obama’s thisness is not the 
thisness of  a President. Of  course, if  Obama has been President, but is no longer, then Obama’s thisness will 
no longer be the thisness of  a President but instead be the thisness of  a past President (and instantiate having-
been-the-thisness-of-a-President). There is an added complication here concerning tensed properties, e.g. having-
been-the-thisness-of-a-President, which I return to in §3. 
1.4.	 Thisness Presentism 
The thisness ontology proposed has three distinct elements: (a) a thisness is a particular, primitive, purely non-
qualitative property of  an object, the property of  being identical with that object; (b) a thisness comes into 
being with an object, is uniquely instantiated by that object throughout its existence, and continues to exist 
uninstantiated when the object has ceased to exist; and, (c) a thisness instantiates higher-order properties, 
which indirectly characterise the object that instantiates it, and the relevant properties of  the thisness initially 
correspond to the lower-order properties of  its object. 
Presentists, who believe only present objects exist, can accept the proposed thisness ontology since it does not 
violate the ontological scruples of  presentism. Although there are thisnesses of  past entities, there is no 
ontological commitment to past entities themselves. Caesar’s thisness, for instance, is not constituted by 
Caesar, since thisnesses, qua primitive (simple, unstructured) properties, do not have constituents (§1.1). 
Further, although Caesar’s thisness ontologically depends on Caesar, the dependence is construed as non-
rigid and so a thisness only depends on the initial existence of  the relevant object, not its continued existence 
(§1.2). 
In what remains, I argue that presentists should accept the proposed thisness ontology because it helps to 
solve two important problems facing presentism. In §2, I introduce the problems and, in §3, I show how the 
proposed ontology solves them. This provides good indirect support for the thisness ontology. 
2.	 Two Problems for Presentism 
2.1.	 Constituency and Truth-Making 
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist. Or, more precisely, that: necessarily, it is always the case 
that only present objects exist (Markosian, 2004: 47, fn.1). Presentism is often described as the intuitive or 
‘common sense’ view of  time (Bigelow, 1996: 35; Sider, 2001: 11; Markosian, 2004: 48; etc.), but it faces two 
important problems: the ‘constituent problem’ and the ‘truth-maker problem’. Consider a true singular 
proposition about the past, e.g. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>.  This proposition exists; indeed, it must exist 4
to be true. But presentists struggle to account for the existence and truth of  such propositions about the past. 
The constituent problem arises because singular propositions are treated as structured entities that depend for 
their existence on the existence of  their constituents. The obvious constituents of  singular propositions about 
the past are past objects. E.g., the obvious constituent of  <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is Caesar. However, 
presentists deny the existence of  past objects, such as Caesar, and thus must either deny the existence of  such 
propositions about the past, or else provide an alternative account of  their constituents.  5
The truth-maker problem arises given the common assumption that truth (substantively) depends upon the 
world, and the even more common assumption that there are truths about the past. It is tempting to hold that 
truths are ‘made true’ by relevant parts of  the world. Given this, the obvious ‘truth-makers’ for truths about the 
past are states of  affairs involving past objects. E.g., the obvious truth-maker for <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> is a state of  affairs involving Caesar. However, presentists deny that such states of  affairs exist. 
 	 Let ‘<p>’ denote ‘the proposition that p’.4
 	 See Fitch (1994; 1996), King (2007; 2014), and Fitch & Nelson (2014), amongst others, for discussion of  the view 5
that singular propositions are structured entities. Fitch (1994) and Markosian (2004) raise the constituent problem as 
significant for presentism.
Thus, presentists must either deny (implausibly) that propositions about the past can be made true, or else 
provide an alternative account of  their truth-makers.  6
A simple way to address these problems is to propose some presently existing entities to play the constituent 
role in singular propositions about the past and to serve as truth-makers for propositions about the past. But 
not just any entities can do this job. In what follows, I discuss a plausible constraint on what entities count as 
truth-makers (§2.2), and then suggest that prominent accounts of  truth-makers for presentism fail to satisfy 
this constraint (§2.3). 
2.2.	 Truth-Makers and Aboutness 
Here is Armstrong’s (2004) characterisation of  the truth-maker problem: ‘What truthmaker can be provided 
for the truth <Caesar existed>? The obvious truthmaker, at least, is Caesar himself. But to allow Caesar as a 
truthmaker seems to allow reality to the past, contrary to [presentism]’ (2004: 146). Presentists who feel the 
force of  this objection seem compelled to locate truth-makers for true propositions about the past. A truth-
maker is minimally understood as an entity that stands in a relation of  cross-categorial necessitation to a true 
proposition, such that the existence of  the entity necessitates the truth of  the proposition (2004: 6). However, 
there is more to the task of  providing truth-makers than proposing entities that merely necessitate the truth: 
to satisfy any demand for truth-makers the right sort of  truth-makers must be provided. For instance, 
Merricks (2007) argues that the right sorts of  truth-makers are entities that the relevant true propositions are 
about. 
An example helps to motivate this ‘aboutness’ constraint. Consider <snow is white>, a true proposition that 
requires a truth-maker. Some entities that necessitate the truth of  <snow is white> nevertheless are not 
plausible truth-makers for the proposition. For instance, the state of  affairs that <snow is white> is true 
necessitates the truth of  <snow is white>. This state of  affairs exists at all and only worlds in which <snow is 
white> is true and so is a candidate truth-maker, since it provides the relevant cross-categorial necessitation. 
However, this is not a good putative truth-maker for the proposition, since that <snow is white> is true seems to 
be a trivial truth-maker for <snow is white> (Merricks, 2007: 28-34). But what is the relevant difference 
between the two states of  affairs, that snow is white and that <snow is white> is true? The former is what <snow is 
white> is about, whereas the latter is not. Hence, truth-makers must be entities that the relevant truths are 
about. 
 	 See, Bigelow (1988), Armstrong (2004), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005), Cameron (2008), and Schaffer (2010), amongst 6
others, for discussion and defence of  the view that truth substantively depends upon the world. Sider (2001: 35-42), 
Keller (2004), and Cameron (2011) all raise the truth-maker problem as significant for presentism. The problem is 
also stated, more generally, as a problem about truth supervening upon the world (Kierland & Monton, 2007). Since 
the problem is more commonly stated as a ‘truth-maker’ problem, this is the problem upon which I focus in this 
paper. For discussion, see Caplan & Sanson (2011).
Merricks’s (2007) demand is neither unreasonable nor idiosyncratic, and presentists who accept the force of  
the truth-maker problem cannot simply shrug it off. Several truth-maker theorists accept that a proposition 
must be about its truth-maker in much the same way. However, it is not always explicitly stated in the 
presentation of  the theory. For instance, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 21) introduces his theory by stating that: ‘it 
is a relevant portion of  reality … that determines the truth of  the proposition’. More plainly, Smith (1999: 
279) constrains his theory as follows: ‘[a] truthmaker for a given judgement … must be, of  its nature, the 
right sort of  part. It must be part of  that which the judgement is about, must satisfy some relevance 
constraint’. If  one accepts the demand for truth-makers, then one should also accept an aboutness constraint. 
To solve the truth-maker problem, we must propose presently existing entities as truth-makers for true 
propositions about the past. The putative truth-makers must necessitate the truth of  the propositions and 
satisfy the aboutness constraint—a truth-maker must be what the truth is about. Extant solutions fail to solve 
the truth-maker problem in a satisfactory way. None of  the putative accounts of  truth-makers propose the 
right sort of  truth-makers.  For brevity, I do not defend this broad claim here. Instead, I show how one 7
prominent account fails in this way and indicate how the failure generalises. 
2.3.	 Lucretianism and Aboutness 
Bigelow’s (1996) ‘Lucretianism’ is a prominent solution to the truth-maker problem that fails to satisfy the 
aboutness constraint. Lucretianism proposes that truth-makers for true propositions about the past are states 
of  affairs involving primitive past-tensed properties presently instantiated by the world; for example, the 
truth-maker for <Caesar existed> is a state of  affairs involving the primitive past-tensed property, having-
contained-Caesar, instantiated by the world. Lucretianism fails to satisfy the aboutness constraint because it 
seems that truths about the past are not about the world presently instantiating certain past-tensed properties. 
Indeed, it seems that <Caesar existed> is about Caesar (in some sense) and not about the world (Merricks, 
2007: 136-7). 
Typically, solutions to the truth-maker problem fall foul of  the aboutness constraint for the following general 
reason. Presentists are compelled to provide present entities as truth-makers. But truths about the past are not 
obviously about presently existing entities. Hence, presentist solutions must say more to handle this worry. At 
least, some connection must be drawn between the proposed truth-makers and the propositions about the 
past, showing how the proposed entities count as the right sort of  truth-makers for the relevant propositions. 
 	 This is a bold claim, but there is little consensus (even amongst presentists) that the problem has been solved. Extant 7
solutions are proposed by: Bigelow (1996), Crisp (2007), Kierland & Monton (2007), Cameron (2011), and 
McKinnon & Bigelow (2012), inter alia. None of  the accounts proposed deal directly with the problem raised by the 
aboutness constraint. Further, it strikes me that Kierland & Monton’s proposal fails for reasons due to Sanson & 
Caplan (2010: 31, fn.10), and Cameron’s proposal fails for reasons due to Tallant & Ingram (2012a; 2012b).
In what follows, I argue that adopting the thisness ontology, sketched in §1, provides presentists with the 
ontological resources to solve both the constituent problem and truth-maker problems facing presentism. 
Further, I propose that, crucially, the truth-makers provided for truths about the past are the right sort of  
truth-makers (i.e. they satisfy the aboutness constraint). 
3.	 Thisnesses at Work 
3.1.	 The Constituent Problem 
Adams (1986) defines a ‘singular proposition’ as follows: ‘a singular proposition about an individual x is a 
proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of  x as a constituent, and 
not merely by way of  x’s qualitative properties or relations to other individuals’ (1986: 315). Although Adams 
does not say so, this definition facilitates a ready solution to the constituent problem for presentism. Singular 
propositions about the past are partly constituted by presently existing thisnesses of  past objects. To illustrate, 
<Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness, and thus exists because Caesar’s 
thisness exists. This kind of  response is perfectly consistent with the more general view that singular 
propositions are structured entities of  a particular kind.  8
Singular propositions are structured entities that involve objects or thisnesses as constituents. The 
involvement of  such constituents preserves the idea that the propositions are directly about particular objects. 
If  structured propositions were constituted by purely qualitative properties, then this would not preserve the 
same intuition about aboutness. Indeed, there is an analogue between disguised definite descriptions and 
propositions constituted by qualitative properties. Definite descriptions are not directly about objects, and so 
do not denote the same object in all possible circumstances. 
Suppose <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is a structured proposition partly constituted by Caesar. This 
propositional constituent determines Caesar, the same actual object, in all possible circumstances just because 
Caesar himself  is involved in the proposition.  By contrast, suppose that the same proposition is partly 9
constituted by purely qualitative properties. In this case, the propositional constituent involved in <Caesar 
 	 This general strategy also avoids problems, advanced by Merricks (2012; 2015), for the so-called ‘received view’ of  8
singular propositions, according to which the constituent of  a singular proposition about x is x itself. (Discussion of  
these problems goes beyond the scope of  the present paper.) Moreover, something like this strategy (i.e. a thisness 
approach to propositions) is also presented and defended by Plantinga (1978), who proposes that ‘proper names 
express essences’ (1978: 132). My project and Plantinga’s do not overlap. However, it is worth noting that there is 
even more work that a thisness approach to propositions can do beyond the defence of  presentism articulated here.
—I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
 	 Here and elsewhere the term ‘determines’ is borrowed from King’s (2014) survey on structured propositions. To get 9
clear on what this term implies in this context, consider the following illustrative use from Kaplan (1989): ‘Don’t 
think of  propositions as sets of  possible worlds, but rather as structured entities looking something like the sentences 
which express them. For each occurrence of  a singular term in a sentence there will be a corresponding constituent 
in the proposition expressed. The constituent of  the proposition determines, for each circumstance of  evaluation, the 
object relevant to evaluating the proposition in that circumstance’ (1989: 494).
crossed the Rubicon> does not determine Caesar in all possible circumstances. There are possible situations 
where Caesar comes apart from his qualitative properties and, indeed, where other objects instantiate the 
very same qualitative properties. 
Next, suppose that <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness. Caesar’s thisness 
has (or has had) a direct relationship with Caesar. This is so for all thisnesses of  objects. Singular propositions 
constituted by thisnesses pick out the same actual object in all possible circumstances. If  <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> is constituted by Caesar’s thisness, then this propositional constituent determines Caesar, the same 
actual object, in all possible circumstances. This is because Caesar’s thisness is (or was) importantly related to 
Caesar: Caesar’s thisness could not exist without the initial existence of  Caesar, and the thisness is uniquely 
instantiated by Caesar throughout his existence. This view of  singular propositions also preserves the idea 
that singular propositions are directly about objects (in a sense). 
In sum, singular propositions about the past are partly constituted by thisnesses of  past objects. This account 
is consistent with general views about structured propositions, and with the proposed definition of  a singular 
proposition from Adams (1986). The propositions generated are thus genuine propositions insofar as they are 
structured entities partly constituted by the thisnesses of  relevant objects. 
The preceding raises questions about the status of  different singular propositions. For instance, contrast a 
singular proposition about the past with a singular proposition about the present, e.g. <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> and <Obama is President>. Suppose Caesar’s thisness constitutes the former, and Obama himself  
constitutes the latter. This seems to indicate a difference in kind between the propositions. It seems that 
singular propositions about present objects are privileged (in some sense) in virtue of  being partly constituted 
by the relevant objects. This would be problematic. Suppose I believe propositions about Obama and he goes 
out of  existence. Now, although I have not changed in any important (intrinsic) way, on this anticipated 
account of  propositions there is a real sense in which I have changed: all propositions I believe about Obama 
suddenly change when he ceases to exist (cf. Markosian, 2004: 49-50). This is an odd result. Presentists should 
not have to accept that the contents of  beliefs change simply because objects cease to exist. 
I propose thisnesses constitute all singular propositions. Hence, singular propositions about the present are 
also partly constituted by thisnesses (not present objects). This is consistent with the general view of  
structured propositions, above, and presents a general and unified account of  singular propositions. 
Here is an objection. If  thisnesses constitute all singular propositions, we cannot distinguish propositions 
about objects from propositions about their thisnesses. For instance, <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> and 
<Caesar’s thisness crossed the Rubicon> seem to have identical constituents. Each proposition is constituted 
by Caesar’s thisness. This is problematic because we cannot then distinguish propositions about distinct 
existents at the structural level. 
This objection fails because <Caesar’s thisness crossed the Rubicon> is not constituted by Caesar’s thisness. 
Every entity has a thisness. Hence, there are thisnesses of  thisnesses. And so <Caesar’s thisness crossed the 
Rubicon> is constituted by the thisness of  Caesar’s thisness, i.e. the particular, primitive, purely non-
qualitative property being-identical-to-Caesar’s-thisness. This means <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> and 
<Caesar’s thisness crossed the Rubicon> are structurally dissimilar. The propositions are distinct in virtue of  
being partly constituted by distinct thisnesses. 
This sort of  response may seem unlovely because it suggests a hierarchy of  thisnesses. But it is not 
inconsistent with the general account of  propositions assumed. Nor is it prima facie objectionable. One way 
to illustrate this is via cases involving propositions about propositions. There are propositions about 
propositions, e.g. <<Grass is green> is true>. But if  we allow such propositions, then there is no principled 
objection to allowing propositions about propositions about propositions, such as <<<Grass is green> is 
true> is true>, and so on. Once again, this hierarchy is unlovely but not objectionable. The same 
consideration applies to a hierarchy of  thisnesses. If  an infinite progression of  entities is acceptable in the 
case of  propositions, then a similar progression is acceptable in the case of  thisnesses. 
Finally let me pre-empt one general concern with this approach to propositions. One might think, if  all 
singular propositions are constituted by thisnesses (e.g. <Obama is President> is constituted by Obama’s 
thisness), my view is impossible to express. One might think: to explain what a thisness is I must be able to 
express a proposition with an individual (not a thisness) as a constituent, because I want to say things like “in 
addition to Obama, there is his thisness.” However, or so the concern goes, I cannot do this because when I 
aim to refer to Obama, I only refer to his thisness. 
It is at this final step the concern breaks down. In fact, when I aim to refer to Obama, and express a 
proposition with his thisness as a constituent (e.g. <Obama exists>), I successfully refer to Obama in virtue of  
the proposition having his thisness as a constituent. When I aim to refer to Obama’s thisness, and express a 
proposition with the thisness of  Obama’s thisness (i.e. being-identical-with-Obama’s-thisness) as a constituent (e.g. 
<Obama’s thisness exists>), I successfully refer to Obama’s thisness in virtue of  the proposition having its 
thisness as a constituent. This is clear and direct. 
3.2.	 The Truth-Maker Problem 
The thisness ontology also provides a solution to the truth-maker problem: truth-makers for truths about the 
past are states of  affairs involving past-tensed properties instantiated by thisnesses of  past objects. The states 
of  affairs involve presently existing thisnesses of  past objects, presently instantiating higher-order past-tensed 
properties that indirectly characterise the object of  the thisness. For example, consider <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon>: its truth-maker is a state of  affairs involving Caesar’s thisness instantiating having-been-the-thisness-of-
a-man-that-crossed-the-Rubicon. The important addition, for our proposed thisness ontology, is that objects and 
thisnesses instantiate past-tensed properties, such as having-crossed-the-Rubicon or having-been-the-thisness-of-a-man-
that-crossed-the-Rubicon. 
Several extant solutions to the truth-maker problem involve past-tensed properties (e.g. Chisholm, 1990; 
Bigelow, 1996; Keller, 2004). However, the use of  such properties has not proven popular; the main argument 
against them is that they are metaphysically unrespectable entities, i.e. they are ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’ 
properties.  I am not convinced by such objections, for reasons adduced by Tallant (2013). And, as Bennett 10
(2011: 190-1) remarks: ‘It is not the job of  a truthmaking principle to, say, deem irreducible Lucretian 
properties suspicious … The only real question is whether there are any’. One issue that plausibly settles 
whether past-tensed properties exist is whether they do any work in a theory. In what follows, I put the 
properties to work in a solution to the truth-maker problem. 
Let me forestall one potential misunderstanding. <Caesar exists> is distinct from <Caesar’s thisness exists>. 
They are about different things and have different constituents. <Caesar exists> and <Caesar’s thisness 
exists> have distinct truth-makers. <Caesar exists> is constituted by Caesar’s thisness, so its truth-maker 
involves being-identical-with-Caesar whereas <Caesar’s thisness exists> is constituted by the thisness of  Caesar’s 
thisness, so its truth-maker involves being-identical-with-Caesar’s-thisness. To be clear, <Caesar exists> is false 
since Caesar’s thisness does not instantiate being-a-thisness-of-an-existent. 
Past-Tensed Properties 
Thisnesses instantiate higher-order properties that characterise the object of  the thisness, and such properties 
correspond to and depend upon the relevant lower-order properties of  the object. As a solution to the truth-
maker problem, I propose that objects and thisnesses instantiate past-tensed properties. Hence, an object 
instantiates first-order past-tensed properties and its thisness instantiates corresponding second-order past-
tensed properties. Importantly, the relevant properties of  a thisness depend upon the first-order properties of  
an object (as outlined in §1.3). 
A thisness gains past-tensed properties that indirectly characterise the relevant object as a natural part of  the 
relationship between an object and its thisness. However, the story here is more complex than the standard 
case. Recall: x’s thisness T instantiates higher-order properties that correspond to the lower-order properties 
 	 See, for instance, Sider (2001: 40-41) and Merricks (2007: 135) for representative objections concerning the 10
apparently objectionable nature of  such properties. See Crisp (2007: 94-98) and Cameron (2011: 59-61) for attempts 
to spell out what exactly is objectionable about such properties.
of  x, and the relevant properties of  T depend upon x’s properties. For example, Obama’s thisness instantiates 
being-the-thisness-of-a-President because Obama instantiates the property being-a-President. Obama’s thisness 
would not instantiate any such property if  Obama failed to instantiate a corresponding first-order property. 
Obama’s thisness gains properties that indirectly characterise Obama, e.g. Obama’s thisness instantiates being-
the-thisness-of-a-former-child just because Obama instantiates having-been-a-child, and so on. However, x’s thisness 
T also gains certain past-tensed properties when x ceases to exist. Caesar’s thisness instantiates having-been-the-
thisness-of-a-man-that-crossed-the-Rubicon because Caesar no longer exists. Caesar no longer instantiates having-
crossed-the-Rubicon, and so Caesar’s thisness no longer instantiates being-the-thisness-of-a-man-that-crossed-the-
Rubicon. This relationship is unsurprising given the framework of  past-tensed properties characterising their 
objects. 
Similarly, x’s thisness cannot lose past-tensed properties that indirectly characterise x. Quite generally, 
nothing can lose a past-tensed property unless it goes out of  existence (or, indeed, unless the property fails to 
accurately characterise it), because the past does not change. For example, Caesar’s thisness cannot lose 
having-been-the-thisness-of-a-man-that-crossed-the-Rubicon. But, Caesar’s thisness can lose other properties, such as 
being-the-property-of-a-man-that-crossed-the-Rubicon. As seems reasonable, x’s thisness T cannot change with 
respect to any of  its past-tensed properties unless there is a sense in which a property no longer accurately 
characterises T. As before, circumstances according to which a property fails to accurately characterise its 
bearer seem plain. Caesar’s thisness loses the relevant past-tensed property because it no longer accurately 
characterises the thisness. Caesar’s thisness is no longer instantiated by Caesar, and so is no longer the 
property of  a man that crossed the Rubicon; but, Caesar’s thisness is the former thisness of  a man that 
crossed the Rubicon. (To be clear, Caesar’s thisness is no longer the property of  a man that crossed the 
Rubicon, because Caesar’s thisness is no longer the property of  any man—Caesar has ceased to exist, and 
Caesar’s thisness exists uninstantiated.) 
An important upshot of  the relationship between object, thisness, and past-tensed properties, is that the 
thisness solution satisfies an extra desideratum for solutions to the truth-maker problem: the truth-values of  
truths about the past do not change in an objectionable way. As Cameron states (2011: 76): ‘One constraint 
on any acceptable theory ... is that if  it is now true that it was the case that p at some past time t then, for 
every time t* later than t but before the present, it is now true that it was the case at t* that it was the case at t 
that p. Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if  it could now be true that ten years ago there was a 
sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn’t true that five years before that there was a sea battle’. The thisness 
solution satisfies this proposed desideratum because x’s thisness T cannot change in an objectionable way 
with respect to the relevant past-tensed properties that indirectly characterise x. This builds on the thisness 
ontology suggested by Adams (1986), Keller (2004), and Diekemper (2015). 
Thisness Presentism and Lucretianism 
The proposed thisness ontology involves past-tensed properties. This naturally invites comparison with 
Bigelow’s (1996) Lucretianism (cf. §2.3). To recap, Lucretianism is the view that truth-makers for true 
propositions about the past are states of  affairs involving the world instantiating past-tensed properties. 
Suppose the natures of  the tensed properties suggested by Lucretianism and Thisness Presentism are the 
same. Even so, the views differ in one important respect: Lucretianism uses the world as property-bearer 
whereas Thisness Presentism uses thisnesses of  past objects. This is important because Lucretianism fails to 
solve the truth-maker problem in virtue of  using the entire world as bearer. Lucretianism does not satisfy the 
aboutness constraint because propositions about the past are not about the world. For instance, <Caesar 
existed> is not about the world presently instantiating having-contained-Caesar. 
3.3.	 What About Aboutness? 
I have proposed that the truth-makers for truths about the past are states of  affairs involving past-tensed 
properties instantiated by thisnesses of  past objects. The truth-maker for <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is 
the state of  affairs involving Caesar’s thisness presently instantiating having-been-the-thisness-of-a-man-that-crossed-
the-Rubicon. But, recall that any satisfactory account of  truth-makers must satisfy the aboutness constraint; a 
proposition must be about its truth-maker, otherwise apparently irrelevant parts of  the world can be used as 
truth-makers. The proposed thisness ontology solves the truth-maker problem because the putative truth-
makers satisfy the aboutness constraint. The solution defended here offers a plausible account of  how true 
past-tensed propositions are about thisnesses of  past objects, in a relevant sense. In what follows, I explain 
how thisnesses satisfy the aboutness constraint. 
Propositions and Aboutness 
Singular propositions are constituted by thisnesses. In particular, singular propositions about past objects, 
such as <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>, are constituted by presently existing thisnesses of  past objects, e.g. 
Caesar’s thisness. Hence, a singular proposition about a past object, x, is about x in virtue of  being 
constituted by x’s thisness. Further, this singular proposition about x is also about x’s thisness in virtue of  
being constituted by x’s thisness. Here is a plausible sufficient condition: for any proposition P, P is about x if  
(i) P is partly constituted by x, or (ii) P is partly constituted by x’s thisness. So, <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> 
is about Caesar and Caesar’s thisness, since it is partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness. (On this account, a 
proposition can be about more than one thing, i.e. an object and its thisness.) 
How does this account of  singular propositions help satisfy the aboutness constraint? The answer should now 
be clear. A truth about the past is about some past object, x, and x’s thisness, because the proposition is partly 
constituted by x’s thisness. So, <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is about Caesar’s thisness and <Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon> is made true by a state of  affairs involving Caesar’s thisness. This follows from the sufficient 
condition for aboutness: a proposition is about x if  it is partly constituted by x or by x’s thisness. Our 
proposed truth-makers satisfy the aboutness constraint because the truth-maker for <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> involves what the proposition is about: Caesar’s thisness. 
Here is an objection. There is no intuitive sense of  ‘about’ according to which singular propositions about 
past objects are about thisnesses of  past objects. For instance, one might challenge that <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> is about Caesar and nothing else. As such, the apparently plausible sufficient condition for 
aboutness, stipulated above, fails. 
To reply, I concede that <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is intuitively about Caesar. But, on my picture, the 
proposition is also about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of  being constituted by it. This follows from the solution to 
the constituent problem and the (rough) analysis of  aboutness, proposed above, i.e. a proposition P is about x 
if: (i) P is partly constituted by x, or (ii) P is partly constituted by x’s thisness. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is 
about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of  being partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness. 
Constituency and Aboutness 
On my view, if  a proposition P is constituted by a thisness T, then P is about T. McDaniel (2011) anticipates 
and rejects something like this move towards analysing ‘aboutness’ in terms of  ‘constituency’, arguing that it 
is not clear what is meant by ‘about’ (quite generally) and considers whether it can be analysed as 
‘constituency’. To illustrate: 
‘[A] proposition is about some entity just in case that entity is a constituent of  that proposition. This sense of  
‘about’ is familiar from work on so-called singular propositions. Propositions are structured entities consisting of  
objects and properties. Some expressions are directly referential. A sentence containing a directly referential 
expression expresses a proposition that contains the referent of  that expression as a constituent.’ (McDaniel, 
2011: 208) 
McDaniel suggests that this proposed analysis of  aboutness does not work for all true propositions and, as 
such, this analysis cannot be the basis of  a reasonable constraint on truth-maker theory. Consider a true 
proposition: <Some person exists>. It seems reasonable to assume that a person, Kris, is a suitable truth-
maker for the proposition. However, on the constituency analysis, Kris fails to satisfy the aboutness constraint 
because he is not a constituent of  <Some person exists>. Hence, Kris fails to count as a suitable truth-maker 
for <Some person exists>. This is a bad result and not what proponents of  an aboutness constraint, e.g. 
Merricks (2007), intend by the notion of  aboutness (McDaniel, 2011: 208). 
However, McDaniel’s (2011) argument does not undermine the proposed sufficient condition, that a proposition 
is about x if  it is partly constituted by x or by x’s thisness. First, McDaniel shows that ‘aboutness’ cannot be 
analysed in terms of  ‘constituency’. But I do not claim to offer an analysis of  aboutness. I specify a sense in 
which a proposition is about an object and its thisness: a proposition is about x and x’s thisness T in virtue of  
being partly constituted by T. Second, McDaniel assumes that it is necessary for a proposition to be constituted 
by some entity in order to be about that entity, but I think that it is merely sufficient. (This should be obvious 
since I claim that <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is also about Caesar, even though it is not constituted by 
Caesar.) 
There is an intuitive sense of  ‘aboutness’ that is captured by examples but also resists analysis. This is, for 
instance, Merricks’s (2007; 2008; 2011) stock reply on the issue, and Merricks is the leading proponent of  an 
aboutness constraint on truth-maker theory. I propose that all true propositions about the past are also about 
thisnesses of  past objects (because propositions are partly constituted by thisnesses). So, if  a proposition is 
constituted by a thisness, then the proposition is about an object and that thisness. 
An aside: McDaniel (2011: 208) refers to the sense of  ‘about’ familiar from the literature on singular 
propositions. Given my focus on structured singular propositions (cf. §3.1), there is an interesting general issue 
in the vicinity regarding whether a complete analysis of  this sort of  aboutness in terms of  propositional 
constituency is plausible. That is, whether we can fully analyse what a proposition is about in terms of  what 
constitutes that proposition.  However, this issue is orthogonal to my primary concern here, which is the 11
aboutness constraint on truth-maker theory. I specify a sense in which a proposition is about an object and its 
thisness, but this is not a putative analysis. 
A Restated Aboutness Worry 
Here is one final objection. Consider the following apparent truism: “truths about the way that non-abstract 
objects were should depend upon the way that non-abstract object were.” I state that truths about non-
abstract past objects, e.g. Caesar, depend upon the way that Caesar’s thisness is now. This view seems to 
contradict the apparent truism. 
 	 Salmon (2007), for instance, develops an analysis of  aboutness in terms of  propositional constituency in a broadly 11
Russellian spirit, wherein a proposition P is about an object x iff  x is a proper constituent of  P. I deny that P is about 
x only if x constitutes P. I think that P is about x if  x’s thisness constitutes P and this is a sense perfectly consistent with 
the aboutness constraint. For some criticism of  Salmon’s (2007) notion of  aboutness, see Armstrong & Stanley (2011: 
220-1).—I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
I disagree. I do not think the view contradicts the truism. Truths about the way that non-abstract objects 
were do depend upon the way that non-abstract objects were. Rather, a thisness has a certain character in 
virtue of the relevant object that instantiates it. For instance, x’s thisness T could not instantiate higher-order 
properties that indirectly characterise x, without x instantiating (at some time) the relevant lower-order 
properties. Also, T depends on x for its very existence and for the way it is now. Hence, truths about the way 
that non-abstract objects were depend upon the way that non-abstract object were. The way that x’s thisness 
T is now depends upon the way that x was and truths about the way that x was depend upon the way that x’s 
thisness T is now. Thus, the way the abstract object was is not of  any direct concern. What matters is how the 
non-abstract object was. 
4.	 Haecceitist Presentism 
Using a thisness ontology to defend presentism is an underdeveloped and under-defended approach in the 
literature. Keller’s (2004) ‘Haecceitist Presentism’, is an important precursor to the view articulated here. 
Keller offers Haecceitist Presentism as a putative solution to the truth-maker problem, although it is not clear 
whether he endorses the view. In this paper, I have proposed Thisness Presentism (which can be understood 
as a development of  Haecceitist Presentism) as a solution to the constituent problem, and as a solution to the 
truth-maker problem that satisfies the aboutness constraint. But Thisness Presentism and Haecceitist 
Presentism differ in various respects, as I shall now discuss. 
First, Keller (2004: 101-2) suggests that there is work to be done to make Haecceitist Presentism palatable. 
But Keller does not do this work, nor does Keller ultimately appear to endorse the view outlined. I go some 
way towards developing Thisness Presentism as a palatable view and show that it can do more than solve the 
truth-maker problem. Second, Keller (2004) develops a novel account of  the properties instantiated by his 
haecceities (i.e. ‘thisnesses’). My account of  thisnesses and properties is more sensible and less revisionary. To 
introduce Keller’s account of  properties, I quote him at length: 
‘[The] entities that underlie the truth of  Anne was sophisticated cannot just be Anne’s haecceity and the property of  
sophisticatedness. Rather, the presentist says there exists the property of  sophisticatedness—a property that can 
be instantiated by present persons—and there also exists a different property—call it sophisticatedness*—that can 
be instantiated by thisnesses. Sophisticatedness* is of  such a nature that, if  it is instantiated by the haecceity of  
some individual, then it is true that, when that haecceity was or will be itself  instantiated, the mentioned 
individual was or will be sophisticated. Anne’s thisness is sophisticated*, and that’s enough to make it true that 
Anne, when she existed, was sophisticated.’ (Keller, 2004: 97) 
To be clear, the proposed truth-maker for <Anne was sophisticated> is Anne’s thisness presently instantiating 
the property of  sophisticatedness*. This is distinct from my proposed truth-maker, which is that Anne’s thisness 
presently instantiates the property having-been-the-thisness-of-a-sophisticated-person. Thisness Presentism does not 
require a distinct sui generis category of  properties (or ‘properties*’) to be instantiated by thisnesses. Instead, 
it builds on the view that properties are inherently tensed and uses such past-tensed properties, which can be 
instantiated by all entities, as part of  the truth-maker account. 
One might complain that this is an infelicitous interpretation of  Haecceitist Presentism and that the 
properties* of  Anne’s thisness are not so described. For instance, one might contend that properties* are not 
sui generis properties at all; properties* are the ordinary higher-order properties described as part of  Thisness 
Presentism. But then this version of  Haecceitist Presentism just is my view. I will concede that if  one 
interprets properties* in this way, then Haecceitist Presentism and Thisness Presentism are not vastly distinct 
views. But it is not clear from Keller’s (2004) presentation that this is an accurate characterisation of  
properties*. The nature of  Keller’s properties* is not clear, and I have difficulty understanding what these 
higher-order properties could be if  not either (i) a class of  sui generis higher-order properties instantiated by 
thisnesses, or (ii) ordinary higher-order properties, instantiated by thisnesses, that indirectly characterise the 
individual that instantiates the relevant thisness. 
Finally, Thisness Presentism improves upon Haecceitist Presentism insofar as my view is able to respond to 
recent criticisms of  Keller’s approach. Consider the following concerns raised by Mozersky (2011): 
‘[Haecceitist Presentism] is troubling for at least two reasons. First, it seems simple to understand what it is to 
refer to or talk about a person. If, however, I am told that when discussing Anne Boleyn I am really discussing a 
[thisness], I am left feeling quite mystified; this simply does not seem to be what I am discussing. Second, … If  
the referent of  ‘Anne Boleyn’ is an abstract property and this property, and other abstracta, can make ‘Anne 
Boleyn existed in 1536’ true, then what need have we to suppose that a concrete Anne ever existed? The view is 
consistent with her never having existed concretely.’ (Mozersky, 2011: 136) 
Mozersky may be rightly concerned that Keller’s view does not address these two issues, but Thisness 
Presentism has an answer on both counts. First, when discussing Anne Boleyn, perhaps uttering a sentence 
that expresses <Anne Boleyn existed in 1536>, one refers to Anne Boleyn in virtue of  expressing a 
proposition which has her thisness (being-identical-with-Anne-Boleyn) as a constituent. It is simply not the case 
that one is in fact discussing Anne’s thisness instead of  Anne herself. Second, although an abstract property, 
Anne’s thisness (not Anne herself), is the truth-maker for true propositions about Anne, it is not the case that 
Thisness Presentism is consistent with Anne having never existed. Anne’s thisness could not exist without the 
initial existence of  Anne; Anne’s thisness non-rigidly ontologically depends upon Anne. Moreover, Anne’s 
thisness doesn’t continue to depend on Anne for its existence, the relation obtains for an instant, and Anne 
and her thisness come into being simultaneously. 
This strikes me as sufficient for showing how Thisness Presentism develops upon Keller’s view (in addition to 
other ways discussed in the paper). However, it is useful to reiterate one final point about the scope of  my 
proposal. Keller suggests that Haecceitist Presentism can be used to solve the truth-maker problem. I argue 
that a thisness ontology can be used to solve the constituent and truth-maker problems, and I propose (given 
the putative account of  propositions) that the proposed truth-makers satisfy an aboutness constraint. Thisness 
Presentism is a more developed and better-defended view and presentists should accept it because of  the 
associated benefits.  12
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